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Incremental development entails the deliberate deferral of 
work to a subsequent period, using technology maturity as the 
measure of readiness. This article illustrates that this approach 
might enable more effective delivery of the first increment 
with a comparison of two major systems as case studies. But 
there are some inherent risks in an evolutionary approach 
as well, and the authors caution that certain attributes of 
hardware products might help determine the suitability of 
evolutionary development methodologies. Mutable prod-
ucts with costless production, continuous requirements, low 
maintenance, or time criticality may be more likely to reap 
advantages from evolutionary approaches. Products that are 
nearly immutable, have binary requirements for key capabili-
ties, require man-rating, or are maintenance-intensive may 
not be best candidates for incremental development.
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Risk vs. Evolutionary Acquisition
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Since his work in the 1830s, Charles Darwin has received much of the 
credit for furthering a theory of biological evolution. While not the first to 
have the idea, he associated observations of species variety on the island of 
Galapagos with species environment, and suggested that nature selected the 
variations that were the fittest (Darwin, 1859). In its time (and since), the idea 
was considered radical and a threat to religious and social order. Mere variety 
itself can be controversial since, paradoxically, variety is appreciated in some 
domains (Ashby, 1960) and abhorred in others (Neave, 2000). 
At the center of evolutionary acquisition are also ideas and phenomena 
about variety and change. As a policy for system development, it too is 
controversial. And as within Darwinian concepts, product evolution involves 
information transfer, interaction with the environment, and unpredictability 
of change outcomes. But unlike evolutionary biology, product variations and 
selections occur frequently and are non-random. Much of what we have found in 
the following research on evolutionary development and project management 
is about how managers must cope with product variety and change. Using 
case study analyses, review of current subject literature, and computational 
modeling (expounded upon in a companion article: Ford & Dillard, 2009), the 
focus of our research was to ascertain the program management implications of 
evolutionary acquisition, obtain lessons learned in past programs as applicable 
to future development efforts, model and simulate projects that used different 
acquisition approaches, derive predictions, and make recommendations to 
project managers for the effective and efficient harnessing and implementation 
of evolutionary acquisition.
background
The Department of Defense (DoD) promulgated evolutionary acquisition 
(EA) as policy in 2000, and soon after, spiral development for the preferred 
acquisition strategy of all materiel (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2000). EA’s goal is to time-phase system 
requirements and provide capabilities sooner. But confusion over terms persists, 
despite further elaboration and even codification in statute (Armed Forces, 2002), 
along with a lack of full understanding of many policy implications—especially 
some inherent risks. DoD policy for evolutionary acquisition mandated spiral 
(i.e., amorphous and unplanned requirements/technologies) or incremental (i.e., 
defined and deferred requirements/technologies) development methodologies 
for all programs. Since all amorphous spirals eventually become defined 
increments, the disappearance of this term “spiral” in most recent (2008) policy 
will not be missed. 
Fundamentally, EA means there will always be multiple product releases of an 
item. The current policy thrust is primarily about the reduction of product cycle 
time within an uncertain environment by using mature technology exclusively. The 
DoD’s requirements process has also followed with “evolutionary” requirements 
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documents—a new idea. Uncertainty is the usual realm of program managers 
(PM), especially in defense systems, and is usually dealt with by seeking best 
information (Pich, Loch, & De Meyer, 2002). Earlier reform initiatives were aimed 
at overcoming information gaps and technology lag. For example, the 1990s 
Integrated Product and Process Development initiative was about collaboration 
for early and complete requirements realization. However, the current paradigm 
is to allow uncertainty in requirements to resolve over time and endeavor 
only what is immediately achievable. The Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) has also urged the DoD to move toward Knowledge-Based Acquisition, 
with Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) as the rubric for program initiation 
(advanced development) (GAO, 1999a). Thus, at the very heart of EA is the 
exclusive use of mature technology to reduce project scope.
observations and assessments:  
Implications of the Policy
We have managed and observed development efforts that employed 
evolutionary development approaches successfully. Two development 
programs of the 1990s—the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and the 
Javelin anti-tank missile system—were compared herein with regard to their 
differing acquisition strategies, TRLs, and program outcomes. Our study results 
support that a more effective delivery of the first increment might be facilitated 
with an evolutionary approach. However, the latest EA policy implications 
and outcomes are yet to be fully known, and some authors have already 
expressed insightful strategic and institutional oversight concerns (Sylvester 
& Ferrara, 2003). We have also described operational program management 
concerns about its implementation, including excessive decision bureaucracy, 
organizational challenges from multiple and concurrent development efforts, 
outmoded technology at release, funds forecasting, transaction costs, and 
maintenance of subsequent increment priority (Dillard, 2005). Our additional 
findings suggest that incremental development may not be appropriate as a 
one-size-fits-all strategy.
vARietY AnD coMPleXitY
For example, variety and complexity are elements of project risk. While 
variety and product diversity are preferred by market consumers to satisfy 
mainstream and smaller niche needs, variety adds complexity in production 
and is costly for hardware manufacturers and owners alike. In support of EA 
policy, the GAO has often used product examples such as home appliances and 
commercial vehicles, which tend to ignore product variety from the vantage 
point of fleet owner vs. that of the producer (GAO, 1998a, 1998b, 1999b, 
2003). The DoD is unique in that it almost entirely outsources capital projects 
for exclusively internal use, and this aspect of lifelong ownership of an entire 
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fleet of systems presents a different relationship than, for example, a product 
manufacturer may have with its production aircraft. 
Traditional views about variety from late design changes are usually negative, 
except for producibility savings and performance enhancements. Changing 
production configurations is not viewed as efficient due to supportability issues 
(regarding spares and maintenance) with lot, model, and type diversity. RAND’s 
study of support considerations for the current mixed configuration fleet of 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) reported, “Multiple aircraft configurations 
drive multiple spare component packages and, in the most extreme cases, may 
drive multiple pieces of test equipment, all significantly increasing long-term 
support costs” (Drew, Shaver, Lynch, Amouzegar, & Snyder, 2005; emphasis 
added). Reliability issues can also emerge because of insufficient testing of 
the changes. Depending on the degree of change, system validation and 
qualification become a concern if changes are not under strict control. There 
may be backward compatibility and interoperability issues as well. Another 
burden is the training impact of mixed capabilities within the force or even 
within the same owning and operating unit. 
Higher levels of risk from system complexity are generally believed to be 
mitigated by control measures, as within organizational contingency theory (i.e., 
centralization/decentralization, etc.). The American nuclear Navy was rooted in 
CAPT Hyman G. Rickover’s visit to Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 1946 to 
investigate the feasibility of using nuclear power aboard submarines. During 
his long tenure as head of the nuclear program, he maintained fundamental 
principles about technical and organizational program structures, not the least 
of which was personal accountability. Those who have worked with acquisition 
of nuclear plant materials know well both the specifications and standards 
of quality that are unique to this commodity, as well as Rickover’s tenets of 
responsibility and accountability that are still in place. They are largely believed 
to be important aspects of how he successfully dealt with the complexities 
and uncertainties of a new application of technology. The Guide to the Project 
Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) (Project Management Institute, 
2004) also asserts that change in the course of projects and products is 
inevitable and mandates the need for a disciplined change-control process to 
control its impacts—from inception to completion. Many other useful theorems 
on systems complexity, change, and control exist to alleviate unwanted variation 
in development and production.
cYcle-tiMe AnD PHAse concuRRencY
We have observed that, though concurrency is a necessary ingredient for 
efficient project management, it has also long been correlated with risk (due 
to interdependence of activities) and might vary significantly with the types of 
activities underway—inferring that periods of stable production configuration 
between development increments reduce complexity in program structure and 
attendant risks. Cycle-time for the development of each increment, and the 
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relatively successive or concurrent phasing of the follow-on increments, will also 
have a definite impact on program structure, budgeting, project complexity, and 
organizational issues, etc. For reasons that we have brought forth in our work 
on the computational modeling of evolutionary development, we have concerns 
about the conduct of incremental development programs with continual and 
highly concurrent phasing of development increments.
Particularly in matrix organization structures, as is often the case with 
projects, there can be a tendency to staff multiple projects with a single 
specialist. The more projects that specialists support, the less they are 
proportionately available to the projects due to “queuing inefficiencies.” Their 
availability decreases because of the need for transition between projects 
(physical, mental, learning curve, etc.). This has at times resulted in large delays 
in project completion (Smith & Reinhartsen, 1998). Similarly, Ibrahim (2005) has 
shown that discontinuous enterprise membership is a contributing factor toward 
knowledge loss in organizations involved in large complex product development 
processes. Examining knowledge flows across product life cycles reveals that 
members often are not engaged in all phases. Whether from rotation of duties 
or multi-tasking, a discontinuous member’s inaccurate knowledge could cause 
a functional error at the individual level, which is not immediately obvious at 
the enterprise’s overall project level. Ibrahim’s findings support observations of 
knowledge loss continuing despite investments in information technology and 
knowledge management.
Development Case studies
One of the most recent monographs we found on emerging results of 
evolutionary acquisition is by RAND—on five immature, non-man-rated space 
systems. Space systems are somewhat different than general force defense 
projects (in their quantities produced, their operational space environment, 
greater proportional front-end investment, and technology development 
periods). RAND also found that evolutionary policy confusion persists and that EA 
added program complexity and uncertainty, especially with regard to budgeting. 
Extending their findings to non-space DoD programs, RAND highlighted the EA 
challenges of programmatic flux (Drew, Shaver, Lynch, Mahyar, & Snyder, 2005). 
They feel, and we agree, that EA presents the opportunity for typical non-space 
project management challenges to be even more formidable. 
The more projects that specialists support, the 
less they are proportionately available to the 
projects due to “queuing inefficiencies.”
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For such traditional defense systems, as expository cases of evolutionary 
acquisition, we analyzed two tactical missile programs that illustrate both 
planned and unplanned change: the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) 
and the Javelin Anti-Tank Weapon System (Dillard & Ford, 2007). Both of these 
systems began as Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
programs in the 1980s and were fielded to forces and employed in combat in 
the 1990/2000s. See the full report at http://www.acquisitionresearch.
net/_files/FY2007/NPS-AM-07-002.pdf for a detailed description of these 
case studies and our use of them to investigate evolutionary acquisition with 
computational modeling. 
ATACMS employed both incremental and spiral strategies for product 
development, benefiting from an elegant, modular independent architecture. 
This program was able to omit its technology development phase by employing 
mature technologies for a leap-ahead capability in range. The basic system 
arrived essentially on budget and schedule, with several successive variants, 
both pre-planned and unplanned. Years later, one instance of a minor production 
change (uncontrolled variety) caused missile failure and a costly refit of already-
produced missiles. 
In contrast, Javelin used the single-step-to-full-capability approach for 
product development. With much greater modular interdependence, the 
program embarked upon advanced development with immature technologies 
in several critical areas—causing significant cost and schedule overruns. The 
system has also experienced subsequent design changes and product variety, 
but they have consisted more as running production changes than as product 
variants or blocks. 
A comparison of the development and use of technology in the ATACMS and 
Javelin projects clearly illustrates the impacts of technology maturity on first 
increment project performance. The Table compares the technology maturity 
in the ATACMS and Javelin projects by identifying the Critical Technologies for 
seven subsystem categories that both products employed. For each subsystem, 
the Technology Readiness Level of the critical technology used at the time of 
insertion into the development is shown. The ATACMS project used only critical 
technologies with a minimum TRL of 6 and an average of 8.1. In sharp contrast, 
the Javelin project used technologies with a maximum maturity of TRL6 and 
an average of TRL5. The ATACMS project used significantly more mature 
technology than the Javelin project and reaped the rewards of program success. 
The relative cost and schedule performance of the ATACMS and Javelin 
projects reflects the differences in the use of technology. The ATACMS project 
had no Advanced Development Phase Contract Cost Growth and only 6 percent 
schedule growth in the Advanced Development Phase. But the Javelin project 
experienced over 150 percent cost growth and 50 percent schedule growth 
in Advanced Development. The poorer project performance when less-than-
mature technology was used supports the potential effectiveness of EA in 
managing technology risk. 
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TABLE. COMPARISON OF PROGRAMS uSING DIFFERENT 
DEvELOPMENT APPROACHES AND TECHNOLOGY  
READINESS LEvELS









Assault Breaker 1977-82 Tank Breaker 1981-82
Ultimate 
Capability






Munition Lance M74 
Bomblet
9 Tandem Shaped 
Charges
5
Propulsion Solid Rocket Motor 9 Two-Staged Solid 
Rocket Motor
5
Flight Control Fin Surfaces 9 Fin + Thrust Vector 
Control Vanes
6
Guidance and  
Control
Inertial 9 Tracker Software 
Algorithm
4





Various 6 Various 6




Contract Type Fixed Price Cost Reimbursable
Tech Development Phase 0 Months 27 Months
Advanced Development Phase—Planned 48 Months 36 Months
Advanced Development Phase—Actual 51 Months 54 Months
Total Time in Development 51 Months 81 Months
Advanced Development Phase  
Schedule Growth
6% 50%
Advanced Development Phase  
Contract Cost Growth
0% 150%
2 4 4 |  A Publication of the Defense Acquisition University www.dau.mil
Synthesis of these cases reveals that as an approach oriented primarily on the 
reduction of product cycle-time, evolutionary development is highly facilitated 
by the leveraging of mature technologies. Also, system mutability, along with 
other factors discussed in the next section—such as time criticality (user risk) 
and modular interdependency—can bolster incremental development suitability. 
For ATACMS, an “open,” or at least elegant, architecture was fundamental 
for modular variety, and thorough design specification and configuration 
management accountability proved essential for managing the complexity of 
multiple product releases. In the case of the Javelin, key capabilities depended 
upon immature technologies and at least one binary requirement, to the 
detriment of project cost and schedule outcomes. In stark contrast, modular 
interdependence was manifested by an almost total system redesign for lengthy 
and costly weight reductions.
Do Product attributes affect evolutionary  
applicability and outcomes?
More questions about EA include whether products with different attributes 
(e.g., hardware vs. software, buildings vs. electronics) may lend themselves more 
or less to the use of an incremental development approach. From the literature 
and cases we examined, we offer the following other product attributes for PMs’ 
careful consideration when planning product capability increments.
MutABilitY 
Perhaps our foremost reservation is the appropriateness of the evolutionary 
development process for all project sizes and product commodities in toto, and 
the application of the spiral process to hardware products vs. Dr. Barry Boehm’s 
(1985) original and most relevant application of this development approach 
toward software. Boehm himself warned of “hazardously distinct” spiral model 
imitations, and in his own words described his vision of the spiral process:
The spiral development model is a risk-driven process model generator. 
It is used to guide multi-stakeholder concurrent engineering of 
software-intensive systems. It has two main distinguishing features. 
One is a cyclic approach for incrementally growing a system’s degree 
of definition and implementation while decreasing its degree of risk. 
The other is a set of anchor point milestones for ensuring stakeholder 
commitment to feasible and mutually satisfactory system solutions 
(Boehm & Hansen, 2000, p. 3).
Clearly, the conceiver of this spiral notion was oriented upon amorphous 
requirements and continuous stakeholder inputs for the alleviation of project 
risk with a very mutable product (Boehm, 1988). The nature of software being 
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in the digital rather than physical realm, it is particularly conducive to rapid and 
successive revision and nearly costless production. And, Boehm encourages 
varying from the spiral model as needed and reverting to a sequential model if 
requirements are well established and the project less risky.
Multiple product increments do not often appear in large, static, singular 
projects such as bridges, highways, office buildings, or in other project areas 
that have typically long lead times or product cycles, such as feature-length 
films, pharmaceuticals, etc. These are what we call nearly immutable products 
and are much different than smaller projects (like rapid software application 
development) with much shorter development periods. However, as with almost 
everything engineered that we can observe in the physical world, even these 
things can evolve and change with additions, spin-offs, sequels (and prequels), 
expansions, etc. Mutability simplifies change, and that idea can be extended to 
many DoD projects.
useR RisK/sAfetY
For DoD, product attributes that are aligned with Boehm’s notion of process 
models being driven by risk are those of mission or time criticality, survivability, 
and user safety. System safety is often described in terms of “man-rating” as 
approval for safe usage.
Time-critical or enhanced survivability systems. DoD’s products have expanded risk 
considerations beyond Boehm’s models of commercial software. Extending the 
idea of project risk-as-a-driver down to the level of the end user, it might seem 
logical to assume that time criticality of the need or mission (in which risk of 
not achieving project success actually endangers customer lives), might be a 
significant factor in the appropriate application of the evolutionary process 
for reduced initial product cycle-time. Perhaps defensive systems are a good 
example. The immediate need for a Rocket-Propelled Grenade defeater or 
an Improvised Explosive Device neutralizer for currently deployed forces in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, clearly dictates that lives will be lost if a 
near-term capability is not achieved. We also cite as an example the National 
Missile Defense initiative in which, given the view of near-term threats, early 
deployment of even rudimentary capability has been deemed preferable 
to waiting for full capability. Such urgency likely precludes full and certain 
requirements specificity.
Non-man-rated and man-rated systems. In the same vein, non-man-rated systems 
(i.e., UAVs or cave-exploring robots—capabilities in which operator lives are not 
at risk if the product fails)—may also lend themselves readily to rapid innovation 
and riskless experimentation cycles. However, user hazard levels for man-rated 
systems may be an entirely different matter.
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Man-rated systems present a different challenge. Configuration variety 
adds technical complexity with sometimes unpredictable interactions. In such 
projects as pharmaceuticals, aviation, vehicular transportation, etc., producers 
mitigate safety risks with thorough analyses, documentation reviews, validation 
testing, and other control and verification processes. By their very nature—with 
lethal hazards for the end user and typically lengthy approval criteria—these 
may not be good candidates for an evolutionary approach.
loGisticAl suPPoRt PlAnneD DuRinG seRvice/sHelf life
Our observations warn that multiple configurations of hardware products 
come at a cost for fleet ownership. Veterans of new system deployments across 
the force/fleet, or throughout any large using organization, know the difficulties 
of rolling out a configuration change. Benefits of standardization have long 
been offered via production economies of scale, commonality of parts across 
platforms, and interoperability. If the ultimate goal is to have standardization 
across the DoD’s force, owning multiple configurations (variety) of a system 
seems in opposition, with added complexity in training and supply support of 
the item. The logistical maintenance strategy cannot be ignored—whether the 
end-item is maintenance-intensive, such as tactical vehicles, or maintenance-
free, such as with many electronics items and munitions, and situations in which 
physical changes are completely transparent to the user. For multiple-product 
configurations, the acquisition approach could have a huge effect on the total 
costs of ownership, as previously mentioned by Drew et al. (2005) in regard to 
UAVs. 
RAnGe of RequiReMent AttAinMent
Most requirements are “continuous,” i.e., may be satisfied in varying amounts 
of attainment. Thus, ranges of their satisfaction can be flexibly specified, allowing 
for thresholds (minimum values of attainment) and objectives (optimal values 
of attainment). Examples are range, accuracy, weight, reliability, etc. However, 
we have found that some requirements, often critical ones, are more binary in 
nature than continuous. They have a much narrower range of attainment, such 
that they are essentially pass/fail or go/no-go in their demonstration. Examples 
are Windows-compatibility, “soft” missile launch, network security, physical fit, 
leak-proof, shock-/vibration-/drop-proof, survivability, horizontal-to-vertical 
flight transition, etc. If one of these more binary-type requirements happens to 
be a Key Performance Parameter, its attainment will be on the project’s critical 
path and highly dependent upon technical maturity. As such, it might practically 
dictate the length of the entire advanced development effort and make division 
into capability increments less beneficial as a development strategy. Though 
somewhat correlated with product reliability, these kinds of requirements 
demand a system that “either works or it doesn’t” without the flexibility afforded 
by objectives and thresholds.
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AMount of cHAnGe—AnD tHe luRe of MoDulARitY
We subscribe to the current systems theorists’ view that complexity is 
comprised of numbers (of components), connections (interdependencies) 
and distinctions (variety). Distinction corresponds to variety, to heterogeneity, 
and to the fact that different parts of complex systems behave differently 
(Heylighen, 1997). Variety is a component of Nobel Prize winner Herbert Simon’s 
explanation of complexity—many different parts with many interactions. Simon 
argued, from his observation of complexity in things both natural and artificial, 
that complex systems evolve from simple systems. And, they do so more rapidly 
when there are stable, intermediate forms or sub-systems (like modules or “units 
of action”) (Simon, 1981). Moreover, he argues the resulting evolution into the 
complex system will be hierarchical. Earlier, in The Architecture of Complexity, 
Simon (1962) proposed hierarchy as a universal principle of complex structures. 
He felt that complex problems could be solved more easily when decomposed 
into sub-problems (similar to how project managers employ Work Breakdown 
Structures via the Systems Engineering Process). And, sub-problem solutions 
could be combined into a solution for larger problems, etc.
Commonly seen today are modular industrial products that are sometimes 
designed as complete architectures, with standardized interfaces that invite 
others to introduce complementary products for insertion (Agre, 2003). The 
Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) is a relatively new DoD initiative that 
encourages the use of widely supported commercial interface standards and 
disciplined interface controls to develop systems architectures using modular 
design concepts (DoD Open Systems Joint Task Force, 2004). 
As in biological evolution, improved “fitness” with a system’s environment 
is sought in the adapting or evolving of systems. But others have noted that 
Simon’s metaphors for dynamic complex systems, useful as they are for 
understanding complexity, fall short of explaining their evolution. While the 
concept of modularity suggests approximately independent subsystems may 
be modified or adapted as such, it has been shown that, in the aggregate, there 
is yet quantifiable modular interdependency that affects evolvability (Watson & 
Pollack, 2005). In other words, how changes in the state of one module affect 
the state of another is relative and measurable. Thus, Simon’s writings illustrate 
that modularity is beneficial for production but not necessarily for evolution. 
Examples of modular interdependency are plentiful. In the aircraft or 
automotive realm, an engine upgrade would intuitively seem to be a relatively 
independent subsystem change. But, systems engineers know that changes 
propagate through hardware almost as much as software in the long run—just 
as the eventual rise in building temperature from the thermostat adjustment 
in one modular room. For instance, adding increased armor protection (and 
weight) for deployed High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles has resulted 
in increased wear-out of drive train and suspension components and impacts to 
vehicle range, mobility, mileage, etc. As a result, “up armor” kits have become 
only a stopgap measure until totally redesigned systems can be produced.
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Thus, we suggest it is not only the structural modularity and standard 
interfaces that enable system evolution; but, it is also the relative interdependency 
of the modules. In short, PMs need to be mindful of the degree of change in 
subsequent increments/spirals. One subsystem is likely to affect another in 
the short- or long-run. And, that can make product evolution problematic. As 
Norman Augustine once said, “No change is a small change”; to convey that 
independent subsystems, even redundant ones, aren’t always independent 
(Augustine, 1997). 
PRoDuction quAntitY
Many might correlate the applicability of evolutionary development with long 
production runs. But we have also collaborated with officials from NASA who 
have said, “No two identical spacecraft are the same,” which seems to contradict 
any idea that like configurations are a necessity among small production lot sizes 
(Roy, 2006). Indeed, naval shipbuilders voice the same about variation among 
individual ships, or within flights, of the same class. And even one-of-a-kind, 
nearly immutable projects like skyscrapers and bridges can be later remodeled 
and refitted, as discussed earlier. Aside from truly singular efforts, we have not 
yet found any universal evidence of an evolutionary approach being more or 
less suitable according to quantity of systems produced.
Recommendations for Practice
Project managers need to be aware of the inherent risks of evolutionary 
development and take necessary precautions to balance those risks. Many tools 
and control measures are developed and available to assist project managers 
in balancing the risks, such as TRLs, technical performance measurement, 
technical reviews, modeling and simulation, real options, project phasing, risk 
management, configuration management, earned value management, and 
organizational design. 
Incremental development projects require steps to alleviate risks that may 
be inherent in the program structure. These include decisions about the number 
and concurrency of development increments and their scope and impact on the 
organization staffing. 
Product attributes may help determine the suitability of evolutionary 
development. PMs should consider characteristics such as: mutability, time 
criticality, man-rating, modular interdependency, key parameters of capability 
vs. range of requirement attainment (i.e., binary vs. continuous), and the relative 
amounts of modular interdependency in the system architecture. 
Rigorous configuration management accountability must be assigned 
and maintained for supportability, reliability, failure mode identification and 
causality, and to prevent the variety generated by EA from reducing total 
product performance.
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Conclusions
Dr. Barry Boehm’s recent book (2004) on software development advocates 
balancing disciplined (more rigid) and agile (more flexible) methods to capitalize 
on the benefits of both. Discipline is needed as a control mechanism to avoid 
risk, but agility is needed to respond quickly to customer needs. Saying, “One 
size fits all is a myth,” he advocates a balanced approach based upon risk. 
Consistent with our findings, he also advocates more disciplined, risk-averse 
approaches for projects that are mission/safety critical, larger in size, and have 
more stable requirements.
It could be summarized that evolutionary development was at its inception, 
and is at its extension, all about risk. Paradoxically, it is an agile method 
envisioned to reduce risk and yet can potentially add its own. On the one hand, 
a spiral or incremental approach allays risk by reducing scope to render only 
the highest priority capabilities with the exclusive use of mature technology; 
and obtains early and continuous feedback from the environment for follow-
on developments. On the other hand, it introduces concurrency during 
advanced development and adds variety in production, with all their attendant 
management challenges.
We have suggested that a one-size-fits-all methodology for DoD system 
development may not be appropriate, and we have offered for consideration 
several product attributes that might help determine the applicability of agile 
approaches. We speculate that evolutionary development may serve better than 
single-step development for initial capability when products are mutable, time-
critical, non-maintenance-intensive, and have continuous (vs. binary) or uncertain 
requirements, short cycle-times (less knock-on effects), sequentially phased 
development blocks, and modular independence. In contrast, evolutionary 
development may not be as suitable when there are product safety or man-
rating concerns and attributes opposite to those discussed here. In particular, 
PMs should understand the nature of their product requirements with regard 
to their range of attainment and relative to key parameters of capability and 
vis-à-vis the readiness level of their enabling technologies. Some key features 
may indeed be binary, and others may have significant ramifications of partial 
attainment—such as propagated change across the entire product componentry 
(as in weight reduction) vs. a more independent modular modification.
Variety can be both an asset (for end-users) and a liability (for manufacturers, 
owners, and supporters). As such, to compensate for product variety risk, 
we posit that acquirers must “own” the design and emphasize configuration 
management, keeping or assigning responsibility for that function and 
maintaining accountability for it (i.e., explanation of how assigned functions are 
being met).
Our title—“from amorphous to defined”—alludes not only to product 
specification, but also to risk realization in evolutionary development. PMs 
must be aware it has inherent challenges, both strategic and tactical; they 
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must balance them with tools that we have mentioned. In this article, we have 
both highlighted and illustrated them, as well as showing that incremental and 
spiral development can indeed work well—especially for technically mature and 
mutable products with open or elegant architecture.
Finally, stability is the quest in all things programmatic: for funding, 
requirements, design, production configuration, etc. But in an unstable world, 
and with the future filled with uncertainty, the only constant is likely to be 
change, and tension between control and change is probably unending. PMs 
do have some tools for coping, and being forewarned is forearmed. Successful 
use of these tools to balance control and risk in projects with a high rate of 
change and concurrency is an area for further research, to improve both our 
understanding and use of evolutionary acquisition. 
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